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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the ethics of emerging technologies by locating the political effects of 
its problematization. Building on Michel Foucault’s analysis of the problematization of 
moral behaviors as a problem about the self, it identifies a problem about the stability of 
the democratic collective within contemporary problematizations of the ethics of science 
and technology. Defining the problem of ethics is also exploring the modalities of public 
expertise, the modes of democratic deliberation and the definitions of material entities. 
Accordingly, ethics is situated particular constitutional arrangements, which constrain 
the ways in which ethical issues related to emerging technologies are identified. The 
American and European examples of nanotechnology programs illustrate the constitu-
tional effects of the ethics of emerging technologies, and the controversies they foster. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2004, shortly after the U.S. Congress authorized the Nanotechnology Act, 
the popular magazine The New Atlantis published an article that criticized 
“nanoethics”, a term that had become to be known as the domain of ethical 
reflection targeted to nanotechnology (Keiper, 2004). In this account, 
“nanoethics” was little more than an artificial construct aimed to satisfy the 
intellectual and financial interests of self-absorbed ethicists. This article 
compelled ethicists and social scientists interested in nanotechnology to ar-
gue for the need for specific approaches to nanotechnology, able to tackle the 
ethical issues related to the control of the atomic scale and the technological 
applications it implied. It directly raised the question of the need for a new 
ethics for nanotechnology. Whereas the article questioned the need for new 
ethical methods to deal with nanotechnology, others argued that the uncer-
tainties about the health and safety of nanotechnology objects, and their 
potential applications in medicine and enhancement required expert inter-
ventions able to close what some of them identified as a gap in the policy 
landscape (Lin, 2007a). 
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This episode is an example of a wider debate about the need for a “new” 
ethics for nanotechnology, a “nanoethics” that would be characterized by 
specific approaches, different from bioethics or from other technology as-
sessment methods1. “Nanoethics” is a term that encompasses a variety of 
approaches (Ferrari, 2010), some of which have been critiqued from basing 
their contributions on “speculations” about future developments of nano-
technology (Nordmann, 2007). It is an example of attempts at developing 
ethical reflections on emerging technologies. As such, nanoethics is a compo-
nent of a broader problem related to the ethics of science and technology in 
general, and emerging technologies in particular: how to define the ethical 
issues related to these domains and how to deal with them?  
This paper argues that the problem of the ethics of emerging technolo-
gies is directly related to the constitution of democratic order. It will demon-
strate this by examining the mutual relationships between the definition of 
ethics as a problem about contemporary science and technology and the or-
ganization of contemporary democracies. It first builds on the work of 
Michel Foucault about ethics in order to discuss the ways in which the ethics 
of science and technology is problematized as a collective issue (section 1). 
This will lead me to argue that the contemporary problems of the ethics of 
science and technology is also that of the democratic organization, and that 
problematizing ethics participates in the construction of the democratic or-
der (section 2). Using American and European examples related to the ethics 
of nanotechnology, I argue that the problem of the ethics of emerging tech-
nologies is necessarily situated within “constitutional arrangements”, which 
this analysis can help describe, and possibly displace (section 3). 
 
 
2. Analyzing the problematization of the ethics of science and technology 
 
In his late works, Michel Foucault develops an analysis of ethics that re-
volved around the notion of problematization. By describing the ways in 
which certain behaviors were defined as problems for the individual, and the 
range of solutions that were proposed to deal with these problems, Foucault 
proposed to conduct a study of the genealogy of ethics, from classical Antiq-
uity to medieval Christianity (Foucault, 1984). While originally centered on 
the history of sex and sexuality, the project gradually evolved towards eth-
ics and the evolution of the self. Indeed, examining the instruments that 
problematize ethics in various periods of time, Foucault described various 
techniques of the self, such as personal notebooks or individual confessions, 
that made ethics a problem of truth about the self. He then accounted for 
                                                        
1 For a review of nanoethics, see Ferrari, 2010. 
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intertwined continuities and discontinuities. Consider for instance the com-
parison he proposes between the Augustinian account of desire and purity 
with those one can derive from the Stoician thought (Foucault, 1981). While 
the first one considers that desire is to be understood in every detail of the 
self even before a single reprehensible act has been performed, the second one 
focuses on practical activities and their consequences. They are two tech-
niques of the self, two ways of knowing the human subject. They are both 
about purity and truth. And while the Augustinian account builds on Greek 
philosophy, it also displaces central elements in the exploration of the hu-
man soul, so that the will (and its potential sins) cannot be examined at a 
distance anymore, but needs to be constantly re-questioned in every move of 
the soul.  
For Foucault, techniques of the self are instruments and practices that 
define the problem of ethics for individual behaviors. The Foucauldian per-
spective on ethics draws the connections between moral problems and 
knowledge about the self. This acquires another dimension in the particular 
case of science and technology, where the making of scientific objectivity is 
also a moral matter, and relies on techniques of the self addressed to the in-
dividual scientist. Historians of science have described the historical evolu-
tion of scientific objectivity, and in particular, the gradual development of a 
“mechanical objectivity” characterized by the retreat of the human subject 
from the production of the scientific representation (Daston and Galison, 
2007). These accounts are not just about the making of objectivity as a sci-
entific practice of production of knowledge. They also provide a history of 
the making of the scientific subject. The birth of mechanical objectivity, in-
deed, goes hand in hand with the development of a male scientific self, able 
to control and limit his interventions in the depiction of nature. The 
knowledge making enterprise about nature requires that that the biases and 
potential filters in scientific representations can be controlled and corrected. 
Knowing and controlling the scientific self thereby becomes a necessary con-
dition for the production of scientific knowledge. Consequently, the tech-
niques used to produce scientific knowledge in the mechanical objectivity era 
are techniques of the self, which developed with the technical apparatus 
through which the scientific self can delegate the production of scientific im-
ages. Mechanical objectivity problematizes the very nature of the human 
subject, and makes it a central issue for the production of knowledge about a 
nature in front of him, with a constant threat of misrepresentation.  
In this account, the problem of the production of scientific knowledge is 
not different from other moral problems, and can be described as a problem 
of individual moral behaviors, to be dealt with thanks to techniques of the 
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self2. But it acquires another dimension when one follows the moral problems 
raised by technological innovation, as voiced by scientists themselves after 
the second half of the 20th century. Consider for instance the case of nuclear 
energy. As historian of science Soraya Boudia showed, the early social 
movements against the use of nuclear energy for military purposes originat-
ed from scientists themselves. Nuclear scientists were “entrepreneurs of so-
cial mobilization” in developing a movement that would refuse the uncon-
trolled spread of nuclear weapons (Boudia, 2007). The life sciences offer an-
other telling example. During the 1975 Asilomar conference on recombinant 
DNA, molecular biologists and chemists discussed the threats caused by re-
combinant DNA and the various precautionary measures that ought to be 
taken in order to avoid potential risks. It can be regarded as the first at-
tempt, in the life sciences, of self-regulation by the scientific community of a 
technological innovation3. In both cases, scientists undertook a moral reflec-
tion about their research and their potential effects. They considered that 
their ethical role was to voice concerns about the impacts of technological 
innovation and explore ways of dealing with them. They associate the pro-
duction of knowledge and the exploration of ethical issues in the definition of 
their role in society. Ethics, then, was not just a matter of individuals behav-
ing in acceptable ways, but a question of collective good. In these cases, sci-
ence and its developments are framed as a problem not just of the individual 
scientist facing the challenges of the quest for knowledge, but of humanity 
itself. Here, the problem of behaviors is not limited to the individual scien-
tist and his sake as an objective producer of knowledge, but concerns the en-
tire humankind.  
In these two episodes, one can identify a problem of measure and self-
limitation, as in the accounts of mechanical objectivity by the historians of 
objectivity . But the problem of ethics acquires, in these two cases, a collec-
tive as well as an individual dimension. The problem of ethics is here not so 
much a question of truth about the self as it is a matter of the stability of the 
human collective. Nuclear energy threatens to destroy all human life on the 
planet. Recombinant DNA, if artificial organisms with modified genomes get 
loose, might radically transform living conditions of all organisms. For the 
scientists involved, these threats were to be collectively addressed, possibly 
                                                        
2  Foucault discussed briefly in an interview the connection between knowledge about the 
self and scientific knowledge as framed in Kantian ethics, which poses the universal sub-
ject as the common subject of knowledge and ethics (Foucault, 1982).  
3 Numerous sociological and historical studies have commented on the Asilomar confer-
ence. For a recent comment on this body of scholarship, as well as a proposition to re-
think the role of this event in the genealogy of the relationships between science and its 
“publics”, see Giesler and Kurath, 2011. 
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through moratoria of at least some technological domains (such as nuclear 
for military applications). 
As it appears through these two examples, scientific and technologies is-
sues transform the problem of ethics as it makes it a collective problem, for 
which specific techniques need to be implemented. In these two examples, 
these techniques rely on the delegation of ethical reflection to scientists: sci-
entists (or a subset of them able to speak for the whole research community) 
are spokespersons of not only nature but also of the whole human specie, and 
possibly of the entire planet itself. These delegation operations have caused 
numerous debates about the role of scientists and the modalities of their po-
litical interventions (Callon et al., 2009). These debates extend the connec-
tion between the definition of ethical problem and the variety of questions 
concerning the democratic organization. Contemporary scientific issues are 
indeed defined as ethical problems in various ways, which all engage the sta-
bility of the democratic order. The next section discussed in what ways.  
 
 
3. The problem of ethics and the democratic organization 
 
In what way is the problem of ethics with science and technology a matter of 
democratic order? Below, I examine three intertwined dimensions of this 
connection. First, the problem of the ethics of science and technology is that 
of the role and accountability of expertise. Second, ethical deliberation about 
science and technology is also a problem of democratic organization. Third, 
the problem of the ethics of science and technology is that of the constitu-
tion of acceptable technological entities and programs of development. 
 
The problem of the ethics of science and technology is that of pub-
lic expertise 
Professionals have developed a body of knowledge about ethical argu-
mentation in technological areas, with the explicit purpose of systematizing 
the forms of argumentations and their values as public discourses. Their in-
terventions directly connect the definition of the problem of the ethics of sci-
ence and technology with that of the organization of public expertise.  
The case of bioethics in America is particularly telling for that matter. It 
has become an expertise with known professionals and stabilized instru-
ments that can be mobilized for the collective management of technology 
(Evans, 2002; 2006). The 1979 Belmont report defined an approach to bio-
ethics that was supposed to answer concerns about the conduct of medical 
research, and which was grounded on four principles: autonomy, 
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beneficience, non malficience, and justice4. Accordingly, a school of thought 
in the bioethics profession then emerged as a body of specialists in philosoph-
ical argumentation based on these four principles (Evan, 2002). For instance, 
problems addressed by these experts consist in balancing “autonomy” and 
“justice” in the definition of the acceptable way of making particular tech-
nological innovation available.  
This mode of argumentation is based on two separations. The first dis-
tinguishes the production of ethical advice and the production of scientific 
facts, as experts in bioethics need the latter for the former. The ethical ar-
gumentation is based on a moral evaluation of technologies, and thereby re-
quires stable descriptions of them. The second separation draws a boundary 
between the production of ethical advice and decision-making processes. 
Ethicists are experts producing “moral” evaluations, which can then be used 
by policy-makers to ground “political” decisions. These two separations are 
not unproblematic: they relate to numerous issues about public expertise 
and its relations with wider scientific and political arenas (Jasanoff, 1990). 
This makes the problem of the ethics of science and technology also a prob-
lem of expertise organization, and a tricky one. 
Consider for instance the case of the U.S. Human Genome Project, 
which allocated 3% of its funding to the study of “Ethical, Legal and Social 
Implications” (ELSI) of genetic research. The ELSI program funded studies 
of the “ethical implications” of human genome research. For all the enthusi-
asm of its initiators, the ELSI program was heavily criticized. A source of 
tension was the conflicting demands it was submitted to. The ELSI program 
was expected to provide ethical advice about a scientific domain with uncer-
tain outcomes, which could also be directly translated into policy-making 
about research programs and the regulation of scientific innovation (US 
Congress, 1992). Yet the ELSI program was also supposed to ensure that it 
was not captured by political interest and based on sound scientific methods. 
Ethics then, and the two separations I mentioned earlier, could be a way of 
answering these demands, but in the same time made it more difficult to en-
sure the policy-relevance of the program’s outcomes. These competing ex-
pectations resulted in a complex institutional history, during which the pro-
gram faced multiple changes of status, in order for the institutional body not 
to be absorbed by alleged political interests (McCain, 2002)5.  
                                                        
4 The Belmont report itself originated from the work of the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. 
5 Critics of ELSI were the basis for the creation of the National Bioethics Advisory Com-
mission (McCain, 2002), which institutionalized the principles of bioethics, as instruments 
for the functioning of the expertise of the advisory committee (Evans, 2006). This evolu-
tion occurred very much to the dissatisfaction of Eric Juengst, a bioethicists and the first 
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This episode is revelatory. The constitution of a body of professionals in 
ethics is connected to issues of political organization related to the nature of 
ethical advice. It faces challenges, which, in the American case, resemble 
tensions that other expert bodies have had to deal with, as they are caught 
between calls for objectivity and for political relevance6. In other contexts, 
the problem of the ethics expertise might take other formats. Take for in-
stance the European Group on Ethics in Science and Technology (EGE). The 
EGE is conceived as an expert body that is supposed to inform public deci-
sion-making, notably about European funding for scientific research. Since 
the renewal of its mandate in 20057, the EGE has been closely linked to the 
European Commission. The regulation defining the 7th Framework Program, 
which organizes European funding for scientific research, stated that the 
“opinions of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
are and will be taken into account”8. In the past, the opinions of the EGE 
have led to restrictions of European funding, for instance for human stem 
cell research. The EGE usually faces two opposite critiques.  The first blames 
European ethics for getting into substantive questions, for instance by advis-
ing the Commission not to fund scientific research about human embryo 
produced within the Union, while it should stick to “general principles” in 
order to follow the subsidiarity principle (Plomer, 2008). It contends that the 
EGE is not “genuinely independent” from the Commission (Plomer, 2008: 
846) and thus pushes for tacit regulation by advocating for the ban of new 
technologies. It then argues that the EGE should rely on general principles 
that allow the market to adequately function (e.g. “transparency”), without 
attempting to exercise “normative power” (which would fall outside the 
scope of its competences) for instance by recommending that research on Eu-
ropean stem cells or nanotechnology for “non therapeutic enhancement” is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
director of the ELSI program, for whom the role of ELSI was to generate knowledge and 
a community of specialists able to use it, with no formalized process of connection be-
tween the production of objective knowledge and that of policy-making (Juengst, 1991 ; 
1994 ; 1996). 
6 Such a tension was clearly at play in the case of the former Office of Technology As-
sessment (OTA), expected at the time of its inception in the 1970s to provide both “inde-
pendent” and “policy-relevant” advice. This eventually caused its elimination in a later 
period marked by severe cuts in the federal budget, as it proved unable to demonstrate 
the link between its expertise and law making, precisely because of the institutional con-
struction of its neutrality (Bimber, 1993) 
7 Commission Decision of 11 May 2005 on the renewal of the mandate of the European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (2005/383/EC), OJ L127/17 
8 Regulation (EC) No 1906/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 De-
cember 2006 laying down the rules for the participation of research centres and universi-
ties in actions under the Seventh Framework Programme and for the dissemination of 
research results (2007-2013), Article 30. 
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not funded. The second critique directly opposes the alleged shallow and 
general approach that European ethics would pursue, and which would ul-
timately base technology development on market rules. By sticking too 
much to the definition of general “European principles”, the EGE would 
take too small a part in the discussion about “ends”, and refuse constraining 
regulatory evolutions (Talacchini, 2006; 2009). These debates show that the 
problem of European ethics is also that of subsidiarity and of the ways of 
organizing the European expertise and its relationships with initiatives un-
dertaken by member states. 
 
Ethical deliberation is about democratic organization 
The work of contemporary ethics committees related to science and 
technology takes the form of deliberations among ethics committee mem-
bers, often based on hearings of external experts. Thus, the definition of eth-
ical concerns strongly depends on the practical organization of the produc-
tion of ethical advice. Membership in ethics committees is a crucial stake, as 
it has consequences on the conduct of deliberation, the competencies re-
quired to actively participate in them, and the outcomes of collective work 
(Memmi, 1996). The tension between the restriction of membership and the 
openness to diverse social groups is pervasive in this context, and makes the 
problem of the production of ethics advice that of the constitution of ac-
ceptable political representation. It is telling, for that matter, that the recent 
revision of the French bioethics law (currently discussed at the Parliament) 
was based on a nation-wide participatory process called Bioethics General 
Estates. The historical echo also points to the inherently political nature of 
who the acceptable participants in ethical deliberations are.  
But the connection between the problem of the ethics of science and 
technology and that of the democratic organization is not just about the 
composition of ethics committees. It also relates to the actual practices of 
ethical deliberation. These deliberations raise questions that connect the na-
ture of technological innovation and the modes of public deliberation in 
democratic society. Considered for instance the case of the U.S. Human Em-
bryo Research Panel (HERP)9, as described by sociologist Susan Kelly. The 
HERP was in charge of consensus production, and navigates between a plu-
ralist representation of social groups and the reference to universal categories 
from which consensus could be built (Kelly, 2003). Accordingly, the issues 
discussed by the members of the HERP were about the way of producing 
                                                        
9 The HERP recommended that the NIH fund research on embryos under regulatory 
oversight (e.g. criteria such as scientific importance, lack of commercial gains…). Yet this 
advice was not followed by the subsequent legislative decisions, which banned human 
embryo research for several years. 
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consensus, and the modalities of the representation of diverse opinion, in-
cluding the most radical ones (which were eventually excluded in order “to 
operate as a consensus-oriented group” (Kelly, 2003)). This example displays 
the tension between the search for consensus (possibly based on common 
values such as the ones defined by bioethics) and the need to politically rep-
resent a diversity of opinions and moral positions in a pluralist society. In 
the U.S. context, this dichotomy echoes long-term debates about technical 
controversies, during which the call for scientific objectivity and the purity 
of “sound science” might contradict the representation (e.g. through adver-
sarial processes in court) of opposed interests. This tension might result (as in 
the HERP case) in the failure of ethics committee to make their position 
heard. But it is the sign, in any case, that ethics bodies are places where 
norms of acceptable public deliberation in democratic society are debated.  
This implies that the places where ethics advice is produced are also sites 
where these norms are questioned. This is particularly visible when the mo-
dalities of democratic legitimacy are not granted, as in the case of the Euro-
pean institutions. The uncertainty about the practices of European ethics 
(cf. above) made it necessary for the European Group on Ethics to release a 
report about the “European approach to ethics”. The 2000 report is a good 
introduction into the modes of reasoning of the European institutions re-
garding ethical issues. It presents a list of principles such as “human digni-
ty”, “individual freedom”, “principle of solidarity”, “freedom of research”, 
and “principle of proportionality” (EGE, 2000: 11). Some of these principles, 
such as “safety”, “responsibility” and “transparency” are deemed “Europe 
specific”. The deliberation of the EGE then takes the form of discussions 
about these principles and their practical meaning for each technological 
domain. For instance, the case of nanomedicine required that the principles 
be re-worked in order to consider that non therapeutic human enhancement 
was ethically questionable10. Thus, ethical deliberations at the EGE are also 
about the nature and implications of the “European principles”, that is, 
about what them specifically European (as opposed, for instance, to Ameri-
can principles according to which converging technologies would be devel-
oped “for improving individual performances” (Roco and Bainbridge, 2003)) 
but also acceptable within a political entity where the concern for subsidiari-
ty is central.  
These examples explain why the sites of the production of ethical advice 
can be described as “experiments in democracy” (Hurlbut, 2010). They are 
about the exploration of acceptable ways of conducting collective delibera-
tion in democratic societies. As such, their success depends on their ability to 
                                                        
10 Interview with Anne Cambon-Thompsen, member of the EGE 
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re-enact the acceptable forms of political legitimacy in particular national or 
international contexts. 
 
Ethical issues are about the making of material categories 
Ethics committees directly raise concerns about the nature of the objects 
they need to examine. A third connection between the problem of the ethics 
of science and technology and that of the stability of democratic order is 
that the former engages the construction of material categories.  
Works in the domain of Science and Technology Studies have been par-
ticularly interested in the situations ethical normative objectives, at both 
the level of universal values and of democratic legitimacy, are intertwined 
with ontological interventions. Consider for instance Sheila Jasanoff’s ac-
count of ethical deliberations about embryo research in Britain (Jasanoff, 
2005: 152-155; Jasanoff, 2011: 63-66). In Britain, research on embryo is pos-
sible up to fourteen days after conception, under the supervision of a regula-
tory body. Before the fourteen-day limit, the embryo is not considered a 
human legal subject. Afterwards, it becomes a legal human member of the 
polity, with rights and protections. This “ontological surgery” – to para-
phrase Jasanoff’s expression - is the outcome of a long process of collective 
exploration of the nature of the early steps of human life. One of the central 
steps of this process was the work of a Commission headed by moral philoso-
pher Mary Warnock, which, in 1985, argued that the fourteen-day limit was 
ethically acceptable. In doing so, the Warnock Commission performed an 
ontological work necessary for the stability of the collective, which translat-
ed in various regulatory measures necessary to implement it at the level of 
scientific research. The 14-day limit was the outcome of a process during 
which the problem of the ethics of embryo research was also a problem of the 
nature of the embryo itself, and of its inscription in a stable society. 
Regulatory innovations about the human embryo were not limited to 
Britain. The European institutions for instance, had to face the diversity of 
positions adopted by the member states about human embryo research. The 
dual importance of subsidiarity and the definition of common European 
principles resulted in yet another ontological surgery. Following the advice 
of the EGE, the 5th Framework Program of the European Union (which or-
ganizes European public funding for scientific research project) banned Eu-
ropean funding for research on embryonic stem cell produced within the 
E.U. (Jasanoff, 2005). This initiative distinguished stem cells produced with-
in and outside the E.U. It acted at the level of European funding, saying 
nothing about research conducted with other sources of funding, and leaving 
Member States free to legally allow or not research on stem cells.  
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It is important to acknowledge the intertwined ontological and norma-
tive interventions of ethics bodies such as the Warnock committee, since it 
forces the analysis not to consider as granted the relationships between prob-
lems of ethics and problems of science and technology. As the discussions 
about the 14-day limit shows, ethical issues are not necessarily about the 
impacts of technological developments, but deal with their very characteri-
zation. Accordingly, considering that the problem of the ethics of science and 
technology is to perform a moral analysis of technological objects once their 
definitions are settled is a particular problematization of ethics, situated 
within particular political organizations (this is the case, for instance, of 
American bioethics, as discussed above). The Warnock Commission, by con-
trast, directly associated the problem of the ethics of science and technology 
and the problem of the making of technological objects.  
For Jasanoff, the definition of the human embryo as performed by the 
Warnock Commission is a “constitutional moment”, that is, an episode dur-
ing which the very stability of the polity is engaged, and the sources of polit-
ical legitimacy explored (Jasanoff, 2011). It is “constitutional” in that it 
constitutes material entities (the human embryo itself), while also question-
ing the allocation of power, the modalities of political representation, and 
the forms of accountability for experts in ethics. One could describe the Eu-
ropean example in these terms. Indeed, the decisions about European and 
non-European human embryos define the modality of political intervention 
of European institutions and member states in moral domains, the entities 
on which they can act, and the form of legitimate collective action. 
 
 
4. Situating the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies within constitu-
tional arrangements 
 
The problem of ethics, as it is raised on issues related to science and technol-
ogy, relate to the modalities of public expertise, to the form of democratic 
deliberation, and to the construction of new material beings. Accordingly, 
the problem of the ethics of science and technology, as it is defined in con-
temporary societies, is simultaneously a problem of constitutional organiza-
tion. This does not mean that after historical forms of ethics practices (as 
described, for instance, by Foucault’s techniques of the self) that solely dealt 
with individuals, contemporary ethics would focus on collective issues and 
only them. Contemporary examples of regulated autobiographical practices 
(for instance in abortion procedures) show that the practice of ethics contin-
uously re-invents techniques of the self (Memmi, 2003). But it is crucial to 
see that the sites where the ethics of science and technology is defined as a 
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problem in contemporary societies are also sites of exploration of democratic 
order. As the problem of the ethics of individual behaviors is, in Ancient 
Greece as in the Christian Middle Ages, a problem of truth about the self, so 
is the problem of the ethics of science and technology a problem of the stabil-
ity of the democratic collective.  
The Foucauldian approach brings more than a telling parallel though. 
Together with research perspectives opened by Science and Technology 
Studies, it also directs the attention to the performative effects of the tech-
niques used to deal with the ethics of science and technology in the shaping 
of objects, individuals and collective orders . Following the discussions of the 
previous section, these effects can be grouped together in the description of 
“constitutional arrangements”, that is, of associations of techniques aimed 
to deal with the problem of the ethics in science and technology in ways that 
define the modalities of public expertise, the forms of public deliberation, 
and the ontological nature of acceptable material entities.  
How does this perspective help rethink the problem of the ethics of 
emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology? First, it forces the analysis 
to situate this question within the constitutional arrangements in which eth-
ics is problematized and which ethics contributes to stabilize. Second, it di-
rects the attention to the sites and moments where re-configurations might 
occur. Following on some of the examples discussed above, I use the example 
of the U.S. and Europe nanotechnology programs in order to explore the re-
definitions of the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies that an 
analysis focusing on constitutional arrangement proposes. 
 
Nanoethics in the US: transforming ethics? 
The problem of the ethics of nanotechnology in the U.S. is situated with-
in discussions about the nature and role of the expertise in ethics, most no-
tably in bioethics. The argument of the proponents of “nanoethics” (who 
created in 2003 a “Nanoethics Group” based at the California Polytechnic 
State University in San Luis Obispo) is that ethics had to permanently 
“catch up” with technological development. The way to do so is to mobilize 
a body of expertise based on skills in moral argumentation, using notably 
the bioethic principles. Ethicists involved in the creation of the “Nanoethics 
Group” have worked on bioethics, “computer ethics” and “space eth-
ics”, and identify the same type of “policy vacuum” in nanotechnology as in 
these other domains (Allhof, 2008 ; Moor, 2001 ; Lin, 2006). While the ethi-
cists of the Nanoethics Group argue for the novelty of the field, they also 
contend that their methods can travel from one technological domain to an-
other, from biotechnology to computer ethics, from space exploration to 
nanotechnology. The problem of the ethical reflection consists in intervening 
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as soon as technology is available, and reflects on its potential ethical impli-
cations.  
Nanoethicists, then, comply with the two dichotomies central for Ameri-
can bioethics – namely the dichotomy between expertise and decision-
making, and between ethical advice and technological objects. Their defini-
tion of the problem of the ethics of nanotechnology is based on the novelty 
of the technological objects: nanomaterials might raise new risks, nanoscale 
brain implants might raise issues about individual autonomy or fair alloca-
tion of risks and benefits. But the methods of ethical reflection are un-
changed: ethicists have to wait for these objects to be developed and scientif-
ically characterized, in order to be able to mobilize a body of knowledge 
about ethical argumentation (which might consist in the call for the risk 
evaluation of nanomaterials, or for the fair distribution of medical applica-
tions of nanotechnology). 
Framed this way, nanoethics reinforces the constitutional arrangement 
that American bioethics is based on, and contributes to stabilize it. It re-
states the boundary between scientific development and ethical expertise, 
and the separation between the mobilization of ethical advice and later polit-
ical decisions (for instance about the regulation of chemicals or medical de-
vices). But the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies is also dis-
placed by critics of the Human Genome Project ELSI program, particularly 
by scholars who argue for a “real-time technology assessment” (RTTA) 
(Guston and Sarewitz, 2002). RTTA challenges the two dichotomies on 
which American ethics is based. First, it proposed to actively intervene in 
the production of science and values. Second, it claimed that it could propose 
an approach that would be directly “politically relevant” (as opposed to the 
ELSI program of the Human Genome Project, see above11) and offered a re-
newed, more practice oriented technology assessment method associating 
“policy-relevance” and “quality research”. 
The RTTA proposition led to the creation of a Center for Nanotechnolo-
gy in Society funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), where pro-
jects such as collective scenario writings about potential nanotechnology ap-
plications and laboratory studies coupled with active intervention of social 
scientists have been undertaken (Guston, 2007; see also Barben and al., 
2008). In the work of CNS and the approach proposed by RTTA, there are 
indeed “new” approaches to develop about nanotechnology and its ethical 
implications. First, RTTA is supposed to act at the level of the construction 
of new socio-technical entities (e.g. nanodevices for targeted drug delivery in 
the human bodies) to which social scientists and engineers are expected to 
                                                        
11 Bennett and Sarewitz used (Cook-Deegan, 1994). See also (Fisher, 2005) for a critique 
of the HGP ELSI program by a proponent of RTTA. 
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participate (for instance, through collaborative work in the laboratory or in 
the development of scenarios). Second, the organization of expert advice 
about the social issues related to technology is renewed by these initiatives, 
in that they attempt to integrate the work of social science in the innovation 
process itself.  
Thus, RTTA proposes to reconfigure the constitutional arrangement 
within which ethical advice has been produced in the U.S. For the analysis 
of the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies, it means that it is cru-
cial to understand the epistemological and normative dimensions of the 
problematization of ethics in order to understand the constitutional ar-
rangements that the bioethics model and the RTTA alternative propose. 
One can then ask crucial questions about the sites where these arrangements 
are performed, the ways in which they stabilize, and the alternatives they 
eliminate. The bioethics model relies on the reproduction of a body of exper-
tise and renders the intervention of ethics in the making of scientific objects 
impossible. The RTTA alternative aims to dissolve the distinctions between 
science and policy, and science and ethics. It is therefore included in the pro-
grams that explicitly aim to develop nanotechnology and directly contrib-
utes to their extension. Eventually, as the director of the U.S. National 
Nanotechnology Initiatives and scholars involved in RTTA wrote, “adopt-
ing an anticipatory, participatory, real-time technology assessment (…) for 
nanotechnology” will “prepare the people, tools, and organizations for re-
sponsible development of nanotechnology” (Roco et al., 2011: 3575). Thus, 
RTTA makes it impossible to question the very fact that nanotechnology 
ought to be developed in the first place. Accordingly, it proposes to partici-
pate in its very making, and makes it necessary for its proponents to explore 
the ways in which social scientific interventions in the making of nanotech-
nology objects might transform them. 
 
 
Experimenting the ethics of nanotechnology in Europe: from 
“ethics” to “responsibility” 
Public concerns of nanotechnology were framed as ethical issues as soon 
as the European institutions defined nanotechnology as a priority in the ear-
ly 2000. The European Group on Ethics (EGE) released an Opinion on 
Nanomedicine in 2007, which was yet another example of experimental use 
of “European principles” in order to define a European approach to ethical 
problems that would not contravene subsidiarity (see above). For the mem-
bers of EGE involved in the discussion about nanomedicine, the field was 
particularly difficult as there was no agreement about its exact definition, 
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nor about the objects and practices it was made of12. Neither the exact defi-
nition of what a “nanomaterial” is, nor the way of deciding whether or not 
medical devices are meant to “non therapeutically enhanced” were available 
to the members of the EGE. Accordingly, the treatment of nanotechnology 
issues by the European institutions was not only about subsidiarity, but also 
about the ways of dealing about various ontological uncertainties about 
nanotechnology objects and practices.  
The intervention of the EGE was complemented by innovative devices 
for the European research policy. A “Code of Conduct” (CoC) was released in 
2008 and eventually became one of the main components of the “responsi-
ble” European approach not only to nanotechnology, but also to any scien-
tific field with future and uncertain applications. The CoC was regularly pre-
sented by DG Research officials as the most visible attempt to define a “Eu-
ropean approach to ethics”, which would both “promote dialogue” while 
“not imposing some forms of ethics rather than others” (von Schomberg, 
2010). It refers to seven “principles”: “meaning”, “sustainability”, “precau-
tion”, “inclusiveness”, “excellence”, “innovation”, “accountability”, while 
also introducing “prohibition, restrictions or limitations” regarding “non 
therapeutic enhancement of human beings” and “research involving deliber-
ate intrusion of nano-objects into the human body, their inclusion in food, 
feed, toys, cosmetics”13. The code delegates to project coordinators and sci-
entists the reflection on both the appropriate domains of research in nano-
technology, and the practical details of research practice, without introduc-
ing mandatory actions or constraining requirements. Therefore, the code ne-
gotiates the constraints of the subsidiarity principle by proposing a particu-
lar interpretation of the balance between the affirmation of general Europe-
an principles and the definition of restricted areas of research for voluntary 
scientists (and, later, for scientists wishing to get funding from the European 
research programs).  
The CoC is expected to foster the harmonization of national research 
programs of member states. Together with the Council, the European Com-
mission recommended that member states “be guided by the general princi-
ples and guidelines for actions to be taken, set out in the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies Research (..), as they for-
mulate, adopt and implement their strategies for developing sustainable 
nanosciences and nanotechnologies (…) research.”14 In addition, it is used in 
                                                        
12 Interview with Anne Cambon-Thompsen, member of the EGE. 
13 European Code of Conduct: 9. 
14 “Commission recommendation on a code of conduct for responsible nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies research & Council conclusions on responsible nanosciences and nano-
technologies research 2009”: 3. 
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the management of European projects: proposals need to refer to the code 
and define their objectives and methods in ways that do not contradict it15. 
Projects might then be encouraged to add research components in ethics, or 
a more formal “ethics board” expected to supervise the potential issues 
raised by the project. 
Throughout these initiatives, nanotechnology appears less as a new enti-
ty that would require innovative ethical approaches than as a general re-
search program of which moral concerns are inherently part. It was, for the 
European actors in charge of research policy, an opportunity to formulate an 
objective of “responsible research and innovation”, which then became a 
central component of European research programs (European Commission, 
2012). Framed in the terms of “responsibility”, the moral issues regarding 
scientific development are dealt with through non-constraining instruments 
(such as the code of conduct) and participatory devices (such as focus groups 
conducted in science museums and meant to inform the definition of research 
objectives for European programs). For proponents of Responsible Research 
and Innovation, there is indeed a need for renewed ethics of nanotechnology: 
it is characterized by the extension of the experiments with European prin-
ciples and subsidiarity that the EGE has been performing in order to realize 
an objective of “responsibility” according to which technologies could be de-
veloped in acceptable ways. This stimulates the development of various non 
constraining devices aimed to turn scientists, research institutions and mem-
ber states into “responsible” actors. By contrast, the European Commission 
that the regulation of nanomaterials is considered adequately dealt with by 
the existing body of legislation, under a “case-by-case” approach according 
to which each separate nanomaterials would be examined within the existing 
regulation of chemical substances (European Commission, 2009). 
This approach has been contested by the European Parliament (EP). 
The Parliament has argued for a regulation specifically targeted towards 
nanomaterials and for the “consideration of all nanomaterials as new sub-
stances”. This ontological stance was followed by a series of regulatory initi-
atives that required the labeling of cosmetic, novel food and biocide products 
containing nanomaterials16. In doing so, the EP had to define nanomaterials 
in a constraining manner and gather them into new techno-legal categories. 
For instance, the cosmetic regulation defined nanomaterials as such:  
                                                        
15 This is assessed through the review process of project proposals. 
16 Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
November 2009 on cosmetic products.  
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“nanomaterial’ means an insoluble or biopersistent and intentionally 
manufactured material with one or more external dimensions, or an internal 
structure, on the scale from 1 to 100 nm”17. 
Contrary to the experimental constitutional arrangement of the Europe-
an Commission, within which the existence of nanotechnology remains un-
certain and responsibility is distributed through non constraining instru-
ments, the Parliament proposes a liberal approach in which elected repre-
sentatives of the European public constrain industries to make it possible for 
consumers to choose whether or not they want to buy nanotechnology prod-
ucts (Laurent, 2012). This opposition has to do with the definition of ac-
ceptable channels of democratic legitimacy as well as to the making of ac-
ceptable regulatory and market material entities. Accordingly, examining 
the problem of the ethics of nanotechnology in Europe leads the analysis to 
question the constitutional organization of the European Union. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The problem of the ethical issues of emerging technologies is raised by the 
actors involved in the definition of research programs. This is particularly 
visible in the case of nanotechnology, which has been construed as a scien-
tific program comprising technological developments as well as social scien-
tific explorations of its ethical, social and legal issues. This paper has argued 
that the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies cannot be considered 
without examining its implications for the constitution of democratic order. 
The way of doing so was to discuss the constitutional effects of the ethics of 
science and technology. As the problem of moral behaviors in Ancient Green 
and Christian medieval times was about truth about the self, the moral prob-
lems of contemporary science and technology are about the stability of the 
democratic collective. The problem of ethics is also that of the organization 
of public expertise, of the rules of democratic deliberation, and of the making 
of acceptable material entities. Together, these three dimensions participate 
in the enactment of constitutional arrangements. It is within these constitu-
tional arrangements that the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies 
is situated. The American and European examples of the development of 
nanotechnology programs and the ethical issues they raise display two dif-
                                                        
17 Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
November 2009 on cosmetic products: Art. 2.1, alinea k. Further regulatory texts intro-
duced more sophisticated definitions, for a discussion of the controversies regarding the 
definition of nanomaterials, see (Laurent, 2013). 
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ferent ways of defining the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies, 
related to two different constitutional arrangements. 
The comparative approach demonstrates that there is no single way of 
defining the problem of the ethics of emerging technologies, and, according-
ly, the range of its possible solutions. But the approach that this paper has 
proposed has more to offer than a description of stable ethico-political con-
structs, among which one could possibly pick up and choose. When asked 
about the lessons one could draw from the problematization of ethics in An-
cient Greece, Foucault was reluctant to “apply” Greek approaches to moral 
quandaries to contemporary times (Foucault, 1982). His approach precisely 
intended to account for the entanglement of certain practices (and tech-
niques of the self) and the definition of acceptable problems. It would make 
no sense to dissociate some of the elements of these social arrangements in 
order to import them in contemporary debates. One can oppose the same 
argument to the problem of the ethical issues related to emerging technolo-
gies. As the problem is situated within particular constitutional arrange-
ments, it cannot be easily dealt with using ready-made definitions of what is, 
for instance, a new method in ethics reflection.  
But this does not mean that there is no critical power in the analysis. By 
describing the problematization of ethics, Foucault re-opened the techniques 
of the self, and the very making of the individual subject. He sought to dis-
place the problem of ethics from that of compliance to general and unques-
tioned norms to that of the making of the human subject. This was both a 
way of accounting for the problematizing activities of the actors he was in-
terested in, and a mode of intervention in contemporary problems, which 
were then situated within particular genealogies. In the cases discussed in 
this paper, the analysis questions techniques of the collective, and explore 
the sites where the making of democratic order is engaged. It grounds the 
ethical imagination in the practices of the actors involved, locates the sites 
where constitutional orders are re-stabilized and where they can be dis-
placed. It is a way of opening up both the ethical reflection and the making 
of contemporary democracy. 
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